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1. Introduction 
Cooperative games suggest the possibility of enhancing the participants’ well-being in 
situations involving strategic interactions. Various cooperative solutions have been 
presented, like the Nash (1950, 1953) bargaining solution, the Shapley (1953) value, 
and the stable set of Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944). An essential property 
that a cooperative scheme has to satisfy is individual rationality which guarantees that 
each player’s cooperative payoffs will be no less than his non-cooperative payoff. 
Moreover, conditional upon the fulfillment of individual rationality a desirable 
property of the scheme is Pareto efficiency. Pareto efficiency ensures that the 
cooperative gains of any player cannot be enhanced without the reduction of gains of 
some other players.  
For games that are played over time the derivation of a cooperative solution 
satisfying individual rationality throughout the cooperation duration becomes 
extremely strenuous. In addition to individual rationality and Pareto efficiency, the 
sustainability of the agreed-upon solution is also of concern to the participating 
players. Frequently, the lack of guarantee that individual rationality during 
cooperation leads to break-ups of the scheme as the game evolves. Haurie (1976) 
pointed out that the property of dynamic consistency, which is crucial in maintaining 
sustainability in cooperation, is absent in the direct application of the Nash bargaining 
solution in differential games. Time consistent solutions for differential games under 
deterministic and stochastic dynamics can be found in Petrosyan and Zenkevich 
(1996), Petrosyan (1997), Yeung and Petrosyan (2004) and Yeung and Petrosyan 
(2006).  
In this article we present a solution formula for the payoff distribution procedure of a 
cooperative differential game that would lead to a time consistent outcome. 
2. Problem Formulation 
Consider the cooperative differential game ),( 00 tTx −Γ  with non-transferable payoffs 
in which the state dynamics is: 
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The payoff of player i  
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Let ),( 00 xtV i  be the Nash equilibrium payoff of player i  if it exists. We side-step the 
multiple solution case and assume that there exist a unique Nash equilibrium or a 
certain equilibrium is chosen. 
Consider the case when the players agree to cooperate and bargain. The agents 
consent to use a vector of weights ),,,( 21 nαααα L= , for 0>α  and 1
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their payoffs and obtain a Pareto optimal outcome. Conditional upon the agreed-upon
vector of weights α , the agents’ optimal cooperative strategies can be generated by 
solving the following control problem (See Leitmann (1974), Dockner and Jorgensen 
(1984), Hamalainen et al (1986), and Yeung and Petrosyan (2005)):  
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subject to (2.1). 
Invoking the standard dynamic programming technique an optimal solution to 
the control problem (2.1) and (2.3) can be characterized as follows. A set of control 
strategies ),({ )( xi τψ α , for Ni ∈  and ]},[ 0 Tt∈τ  brings about an optimal solution for
the dynamic programming problem (2.1) and (2.3) if there exists a differentiable 
function RRTtxtW m →×],[:),( 0)(α  satisfying the following partial differential 
equation:  
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Substituting the cooperative strategies ),({ )( xi τψ α , for Ni ∈  and ]},[ 0 Tt∈τ  into 
(2.1) yields the dynamics of the cooperative state trajectory 
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We use T tttx 0)}({ )( =α  to denote the solution to (2.5). 
 Note that the cooperative strategies ),({ )( xi τψ α , for Ni ∈  and ]},[ 0 Tt∈τ of the 
dynamic programming problem generated by (2.4) are also strategies solving the 
optimal control problem (2.3). We can call these cooperative strategies Pareto optimal 
controls under cooperation. 
 The payoff of player i  under cooperation can be obtained as: 
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At the start of the game for individual rationality to hold under the optimal 
state T tx 0)}({ )( =τα τ  in the cooperative game ),( 00 tTx −Γ  it is required that 
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But it may happen that as the game proceeds there exist ],[ 0 Ttt ∈  such that 
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Time-inconsistency of the individual rationality condition appears if (2.8) happens. 
3. Time-consistent Solution Formula 
To overcome the time inconsistency problem in (2.8), we follow Petrosyan (1993 and 
1997) and introduce a payoff distribution procedure (PDP) with a set of functions
)(τβ i  for ],[ 0 Tt∈τ  such that 
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which requires the satisfaction of the condition:  
                      ≥∫
T
t i
dττβ )( ),( )(αxtV i , for Ni ∈ and ],[ 0 Ttt ∈ .   (3.2) 
If we substitute ))(,( )( ττ αxhi  by )(τβ i , individual rationality will hold in all 
subgames along the cooperative trajectory )()( ταx for ],[ 0 Tt∈τ . Next we present a 
formula for the function )(τβ i  which satisfies (3.2). 
Formula 3.1. 
A payoff distribution procedure )(τβ i  with the form  
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would yield a time-consistent payoff which guarantees individual rationality along the 
cooperative trajectory )()( ταx for ],[ 0 Tt∈τ . 
Proof:  
Using (3.3) we obtain 
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Hence individual rationality is upheld throughout ],[ 0 Ttt ∈  along the cooperative 
trajectory.          □ 
4. Strategic Support of Pareto Optimal Solution 
Consider a new game ( )0,0 tTx −Γα  which differs from the original game ( )0,0 tTx −Γ
only with payoffs of players along the Pareto-optimal trajectory ( )( )ταx  for [ ]Tt ,0∈τ
and connected trajectories. 
Let ( )nuutTxiK ,,1;0,0 K−α  denote the payoff of player Ni ∈  in the game 
( )0,0 tTx −Γα , and let ( )τx  for [ ]Tt ,0∈τ  denote the corresponding trajectory. 
Then 
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(Here for ( )( )ταx  is the Pareto-optimal trajectory). 
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In a special case when ( ) ( )( )τατ xx =  for [ ]Tt ,0∈τ , that is ( )τx  coincides with the 
Pareto-optimal trajectory, we obtain 
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Be definition of the payoff functions in the game ( )0,0 tTx −Γα  we obtain the 
condition that along the Pareto-optimal trajectory the payoffs in ( )0,0 tTx −Γα  and the 
in ( )0,0 tTx −Γ  coincide. 
Definition 4.1. The game ( )0,0 tTx −Γα  is a regularization of the game ( )0,0 tTx −Γ  if 
the PDP ( )τβi  is defined by formula (3.3). 
Definition 4.2. Consider the dynamic system 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) 00,,,1,, xtxnuuxfx == τττττ K&  and [ ]Tt ,0∈τ . (1) 
Let ( )txy =  denote the point that is reached from the solution of system (1) under a 
given n -tuple of controls ( ) ( ) ( )( )τττ nuuu ,,1 K=  for [ ]Tt ,0∈τ . The set of all possible 
( )txy =  under different controls ( )τu  for [ ]Tt ,0∈τ  is called the reachable set of system 
(1) from initial state 0x  at time instant [ ]Ttt ,0∈ . We denote the reachable set of 
system (1) by ( )tTxC −,0 . 
Consider now the problem of strategic stability of the cooperation scheme. Using 
(3.3) one can prove the following theorem. 
Theorem 4.1. In the regularized game ( )0,0 tTx −Γα  for every 0>ε , there exists an 
ε  -Nash equilibrium with Pareto-optimal payoffs 
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if the following condition is satisfied: 
Suppose ( )tTxCy −∈ ,0  for [ ]Ttt ,0∈ , where ( )tTxCy −∈ ,0  is the reachable set of the 
dynamical system (2.1) from initial state 0x  at moment t , and ( )nψψψ ,,1 K=  is any 
fixed n -tuple of feedback strategies in ( )0,0 tTx −Γ . Then the payoff function  
( )ntTyiK ψψ ,,1;, K−  
is a continuous function of y  and t , for ( )tTxCy −∈ ,0  and [ ]Ttt ,0∈  for any n -tuple of 
feedback strategies ( )nψψψ ,,1 K= . 
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